Not only science but also poetry and thinking conduct experiments. These experiments do not simply concern the truth or falsity of hypotheses . . . rather, they call into question Being itself, before or beyond its determination as true or false. These experiments are without truth, for truth is what is at issue in them . . . . Whoever submits himself to [them] jeopardizes not so much the truth of his own statements as the very mode of his existence; he undergoes an anthropological change that is just as decisive in the context of the individual's natural history as the liberation of the hand by the erect position was for the primate or as was, for the reptile, the transformation of limbs that changed it into a bird.
Giorgio Agamben, 'Bartelby, or On Contingency' (1999 For John Burrows, salve! I am greatly honoured, especially because this award is given by the community of people among whom a quarter-century ago I found the intellectual home where I have thrived and prospered. I've thought long and hard about what to say: whether to present new results or to make something of how I got here from there. I've decided to do both: new results because I suffer from intellectual claustrophobia and want reactions to the cure I'm taking; retrospection because this occasion demands that a 'life of learning' be told as a meaningful story. 
Retrospection
I begin with retrospection shaped by a moral. I cannot describe anything remotely like a career path because there was none. My trackless wanderings were affected by far too many accidents, though (I like to think) steadily driven by hunger for learning. Let me just say that I came to the PhD in Milton studies in 1976 with training in physics, English, German and Latin literature and mathematics, and years spent as a programmer in Fortran and assembly language on some big machines. Eight years of obsessive devotion to John Milton's biblical and classical sources earned me the degree in 1984. The plan was to become a professor of English, but that didn't happen, despite powerful help. I spent a dozen years in academic limbo. While there I reverted to computing, moved into humanities computing (as we called it then), 3 learned a lot about other people's research, and fell into a prolonged study of Ovid's Metamorphoses, by which I had become captivated. Its structure fascinated me. How, I wondered, did the poem manage so successfully to tease us with promise of structure yet always elude our grasp? Like Father Busa before me I turned to computing for help, on a smaller scale but for the same reasons.
Markup seemed the obvious way to go. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) was the standard, Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) as yet unborn. I created my own scheme, rejecting SGML to make sure that my thinking would be as free from preexisting theoretical commitments as possible. 4 I targeted names, which I reasoned were literary enough to tell me about structure, verbal enough to handle with a machine. Names quickly became all devices of language indicating persons. About 60,000 tags resulted, i.e. an average of 5 per line of poetry. I worked on it both alone and with research assistants, 5 in Toronto and then in London after moving there in 1996, finally abandoning it when at last I realized that markup was radically wrong for the job, indeed that no conceivable technology would prove remotely adequate. But no matter: those years of work had already led me to the vein of gold I have been following ever since: an idea of what happens when Mr Turing's implemented idea of mathematical rigour meets the fluid, metamorphic genius of poetry.
Back up some years. In April 1987 at the International Conference for Computers and the Humanities in Columbia, South Carolina, I met Michael Sperberg-McQueen, whose eloquent rhetoric stirred up the righteous discontent of colleagues who like me were languishing on the academic periphery. Humanist was the result. 6 I threw myself into it, never for a moment thinking it would pay off. How wrong I was! Nearly a decade later, in 1996, Harold Short, whom I met in Toronto because of Humanist, changed everything by seeing to it that I was propelled quite unexpectedly across the Pond into my first academic appointment, which I still hold. Humanist continues to be my primary academic forum.
I promised you a moral to my story, which I take from the great 12th-century Jewish philosopher Moshe ben Maimon's Commentary on the Mishnah:
hbham ala w?ut al <y?wu <ta? lk whatever you do, do it only out of love.
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And from the physician Thomas Fuller's Gnomologia (1732), I draw these helpful proverbs to hammer it home:
He that hath Love in his Breast, hath Spurs at his Heels (2160); Love will creep, where it cannot go (3301); Love lives more in Cottages than Courts (3290); and finally, The Soul is not where it lives, but where it loves (4761).
To put the matter more personally and viscerally, I didn't walk a career path but followed the smell of food on the wind. And here I am, to say thank you all for the friendship, inspiration, sustenance, audience, and now this, in the name of the great Jesuit scholar, Roberto Busa. Mille grazie! But I do wonder, why me? I am a quite oldfashioned scholar, who works by himself, shuns collaborative teams and the grants that fuel them, who has written no code for decades, knows not TEI, and teaches solely face to face. For many years I have insisted, contrary to Ronald Reagan when he worked as promo-man for General Electric (Reagan 1961) , that failure is our most important product, partly for the shock-value, as antidote to the hype of pervasive techno-triumphalism, but also to stress that computing is an ongoing, never ending experimental process.
8 I've argued that the main thing is to fail so well that all you can see is Jerome McGann's 'hem of a quantum garment ' (2004: 201 )-a phrase he used, you may recall, to describe the intractable non-residual leftovers markup cannot capture, hence its potential for illumination.
My struggle with the Metamorphoses laid groundwork for my book Humanities Computing (2005) .
Twenty years earlier Brian Cantwell Smith had observed that computers can only approximate reality according to a necessarily simplified, hence incorrect, model of it (Smith 1985) . So I could see that in principle my attempts to pin Ovid down were bound to fail. But by the time I came to think about Ovid two things had happened: progress had liberated digital computing from its confinement to mainframes, giving me a little machine of my own to play with; and I had met the great Australian ethnohistorian Greg Dening, who introduced me to the present participle (cf. Dening 2002 and . So I could see that Brian had fastened on the wrong part of speech: modelling, not model, had to be the central idea. In other words I rediscovered the essential truth of the hackers' 'Hands-on Imperative' against the industrializing effects of batch-mode computing (Levy 2010 (Levy /1984 . And so the book. But then, as always, intellectual claustrophobia took hold. By demonstrating the conceptual inadequacy of our tools, modelling the Metamorphoses had left me nowhere to go. And modelling itself was at once too pat an answer and unable to do more than work through consequences of interpretation that had already happenedelsewhere by other means.
Coming to the end of my own road alerted me to the others whose fate I shared, and so to wonder if I might figure a way out by finding out what it had been like for them. Hence my turn to history.
A History of the Present From an Emotional Past
What I found and what I think it amounts to, forms the remainder of this lecture. But I am going to tell you particular kind of story, which I learned about from Ian Hacking (to whom I owe so much), who learned about it from Michel Foucault: a 'history of the present', Foucault called it, because it sets out to 'recognize and distinguish historical objects in order to illumine our own predicaments'.
9 Writing in 1940 with the Gestapo at his heels, Walter Benjamin put the case more starkly, just as we need it to be:
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger . . . . In every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it . . . . Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious. (1968/1955: 255) For us the danger is that our being of as well as in the humanities remain an unanswered, even unasked, question. It is the predicament Steve Ramsay describes in Reading Machines (2011): the almost total grip of hermeneutical inhibitions on digital humanities, to the point of willful blindness to the centrality of interpretation. The primary historical object I want to bring into focus and call on for help with this predicament is the uncanny otherness of computing, its anomalous existential ambiguity. I will argue that the surviving evidence of fear this otherness once provoked, and continues occasionally to stir up, is a clue to a common ground with the humanities beyond utilitarian value or social impact.
But to avoid misunderstanding I must pause a moment to clarify what I mean by fear. The difficulty I have begins with a reluctance I think we share to admit fear or attribute it to anyone whom we respect, in particular (given our profession) fear of computing. When the subject comes up, as it will in this lecture again and again, reluctance may bolster the common assumption that the emotions are natural or at least fixed psychological kinds and are an interference to rather than component of intelligence. In ordinary life we are wiser: thus the Oxford English Dictionary glosses the word as denoting 'all degrees of the emotion' 10 that (like the Devil) is known under so many names. I need the continuum this implies to be able to make sense of the historical actors and actions that are the focus of attention here, and so cannot risk the assumption that fear has an objective taxonomy of clear-cut and stable distinctions. It simply doesn't, as its history and current research in psychology demonstrate.
So in the following let us agree that fear has many guises, and-allow me to go out on a limb-that the presence of one degree of it does not preclude the presence, however hidden, of others.
I concentrate on fear rather than positive emotional response because dystopic visions of computing and reactions to them tell us far more about the psychological, intellectual, and professional disruptions it brought about (cf Hatfield 1928: 10). These were not just to the humanities and other technologically undereducated cohorts. The fearful threat of profound change was felt likewise in the sciences. Thus, in the early 1970s the physicist Leon Kowarski, writing about 'The Impact of Computers on Nuclear Science', expressed much the same existential and cognitive worries as did his humanist colleagues:
The vision of these huge and costly machines . . . is in a way terrifying. The era of the ingenious scientist . . . seems to be past. The machine will have to run just 'because it is there', and according to its own rules. And from each run-there will be not much sense in calling them experiments any more-there will be a rich harvest of recorded data, like a deep-sea dredge . . . . There will be a lot of attempts to judge such new situations by old value criteria. What is a physicist? What is an experimenter? . . . Is the man who accumulates print-outs of solved equations a mathematical physicist? And the ultimate worry: are we not going to use computers as a substitute for thinking? '. 12 Furthermore, I will argue, the fear this threat provoked, though negative, is more than simply negative: it is in fear's nature to fore-feel the unknown, the new, the anomalous, as I said, the uncanny. 13 I begin where I will end, in the digital humanities, first by probing its professional literature. Then I will move outward in three stages, expanding the historical context as I go: first to daily life during the early period; then to the scientific programme from which computing arose; then very briefly (and very ambitiously) to an historical process that Agamben, with reference to our current preoccupation, calls the anthropological machine (2004/2002) . I shall concentrate on literary computing to simplify, I hope not falsify, the bigger picture.
Shall We Come Rejoicing?
Allow me first to moralize a bit more, this time to advance the cause of acquisitive hunger for learning. This hunger is obviously one of my besetting sins. But I have a good reason for not repenting, despite good advice that I simply say what I think. In fact this is the way I think, by assembling scraps from other disciplines and making a kind of intellectual quilt suitable for our radically interdisciplinary and quite immature amalgam of interests.
14 Nelson Goodman has observed that quotation is a tool of worldmaking (1978: 56) . We have a world to make. Do you know the biblical story of Ruth the Moabite, of her gleaning in Boaz's field in order to feed her mother-in-law and herself? So, I say, are we: Ruth-like as a young discipline, migrants in need of the food of others, which is lying on the ground, i.e. in libraries and online, freely for the taking, in seemingly endless and compelling abundance.
Make no mistake: we are surrounded by mature, subtle civilizations of enquiry, whose intellectual resources dwarf our own in volume, variety, and sophistication. I think, for example, of philosopher Myles Burnyeat's 'Message from Heraclitus ' (1985) or of G. E. R. Lloyd's Cognitive Variations (2007; Inwood and McCarty 2010) . I wonder, after catching my breath, when will we be able to write with such deep and farreaching power? We may be smart, with the wind in our sails, but raw intellect alone and popularity aren't enough. Being in possession of our own island of knowledge, autonomous, with our own agenda (when at last we have one), conferences, and publications, all that is necessary but not enough. We need far more than the luck of the moment, dozens of sessions at the MLA, THATCamps everywhere, millions of tweets, thousands of blogs and so on and so forth. 15 We need resonance with the intellectual cultures of the arts and humanities, just as a great organ needs an acoustically adequate space for its music to move the listener. (There, that's me, saying exactly what I think.)
We need the techno-sciences just as much, more than many of us realize, more than some of us fear. Scientism is a problem, but without the sciences we denature the technological side of our discipline by severing it from its epistemological roots. We turn our backs on a literature full of wonders, on intellectual excitement and real help. We need to understand, for example, the implications of introducing experiment-which is exactly what we do-into the humanities. 16 And we need to recognize the other 'styles of scientific reasoning', as Hacking has called them (2002; , which have come into the humanities via the back door of computing (McCarty 2008) .
We have much to learn from the technologically aware artists such as Stelarc 17 and Marcel-lí Antú nez Roca
18
, who are far less confused about the sciences than we seem to be. Both of them performed at the recent IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, where a number of us spoke (please note: at the invitation of the roboticists) on 'Robotics and the Humanities'. 19 I was reminded of the 1968 Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition in London, at which artists and engineers experimented with ideas so far ahead of their time they remain mostly ahead of ours. 20 We have much to learn as well from the scholarwriters with strong scientific interests, such as Gillian Beer, who works on Darwin (2009 Darwin ( /1983 , Laura Otis, on 19 th -century technology (2001), and A. S. Byatt (2005 Byatt ( , 2000 , whose fascination with the sciences informs her fiction. And near at hand is the disciplinary bridge built by historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, opened to us in the early 1960s when, in Hacking words, philosophers 'finally unwrapped the cadaver [they had made of science] and saw the remnants of an historical process of becoming and discovering ' (1983: 1) . To many of us, alas, there is still only the cadaver. Some hallucinate a zombie.
Where and what are we amidst all this abundance? Do we even know it exists? I've imagined us as maritime explorers in an archipelago of disciplines, peripatetic, prowling the margins; I've imagined us with the novelist David Malouf, adventurous youth discovering life and death in a wild, dangerous acre of bush (McCarty 2006) ; with Greg Dening, 'on the edge of things in a great ring of viewers ' (1998: 183) ; with historian Peter Galison, in the trading zone (Gorman 2010) , or as Dening says, on the 'beaches of the mind ' (1998: 85-8) . And this is why I am so pleased to have been named at Digital Humanities 2013 the 'Obi-Wan Kenobi of digital humanities': 21 to be honoured for the marginal, peripatetic life of learning I have been able to lead and continue, deo volente, to live with you.
I am pleased to have been considered, just for the moment now gone, an eremitic elder possessed of powers beyond the ordinary, kindly but serious and not to be messed with. I am thrilled to be linked through Obi-Wan to Sir Alec Guinness, who made the part come alive (and had the good sense to shun the connection later). When Sir Alec was interviewed on the BBC Radio 4 programme Desert Island Discs in 1977, just prior to the release of Star Wars, he was asked what role he was playing in that film. 22 He answered, 'I don't know what I play-a wise old-an allegedly wise old character from outer space'. But however Obi-Wan'ish, I cannot agree to 'wise'; 'old' I will not admit to; and as far as I know I came into the world in the way of all flesh and was raised in a small California town, though (I understand from the locals) flying saucers have been seen in the area. 
Courting Catastrophe
But now back to earth, to the present, to our worldbuilding. The raw material is abundantly to hand. What do we do with it? What governs the design of our quilt?
After a talk at Cambridge in 2012 I was asked by the historian of ancient science Geoffrey Lloyd one of those questions I live to be asked: where would we be with our digital scholarship in 20 years? On what did I think our sights could be set most ambitiously? What I fumbled then to say I am still fumbling with, but here's another go.
I spoke earlier of computing's otherness-a more dramatic way of referring to the distancing effect Julia Flanders has gently called 'productive unease' (2009). She makes a strong case for the contribution of the digital humanities in foregrounding 'issues of how we model the sources we study, in such a way that [these issues] cannot be sidestepped ' (2009: 22) . I know this to be true from long experience unable to sidestep them. But what about those for whom digital resources are made, who aren't themselves makers? I know I'm not the first to find fault with principles of design that conceal the difficulties and provide no means of struggling with them. There are deep, tough questions here as to how and at what level the essential struggle is enacted. But Flanders' point remains: the struggle is the point of it all. And we do not, or should not, emerge from it unscathed! (Again and again I will insist on this: being scathed is paradoxically our salvation.) Love may be 'an ever-fixéd mark'; we humans aren't. If we are not changed in response to computing we imprison ourselves with it.
This struggle is a nascent form of reasoning that we have done for millennia with tools. But the potential-here is the answer to Lloyd's question-is for reasoning to evolve in concert with a radically adaptive tool, something more than the steersman's tiller that inspired cybernetics, 24 less perhaps than a conversational partner-but almost that, or perhaps exactly that. As we get close to conversational machines, our attempts produce, in Robert Hughes' famous phrase, 'the shock of the new'. 25 We share with the roboticists the chance, in Warren McCulloch's words, to ride the shock-wave by engaging deliberately with 'that miscegenation of Art and Science which begets inanimate objects that behave like living systems ' (1968: 9) . I call the result catastrophic in Stephen Jay Gould's evolutionary sense, as that which punctuates the equilibrium of which we are a living part and so initiates developmental change. 26 Such catastrophe implies a deep, not merely utilitarian, relationship between machine and human. Again the artists are there. In 1935 the Polish artist Bruno Schulz compared the work of art to a baby in statu nascendi, in the midst of being born, still operating 'at a premoral depth'. 'The role of art', he wrote, 'is to be a probe sunk into the nameless ' (1998/1935: 368-70 (Aspray 1990: 40, 180-1) ; and from that architecture to a modular conception of mind which reflected it (e.g. Fodor 1983 ). Back and forth, back and forth. In 1948 von Neumann proposed that the problem of imitating natural intelligence might better be done 'with a network that will fit into the actual volume of the human brain ' (1951: 34; 1958: 48) . At the time of writing, the DARPA SyNAPSE program is working toward precisely that goal, 28 using neuromorphic hardware that reflects current ideas of neurological plasticity. 29 The pace of development is now so fast that neurophysiological models of consciousness and architectures of computing are a blurry chicken-andegg. But that's precisely my point: the traffic between self-conception and invention goes in a loop. I want to ask what we can do to make that loop go for us and for the humanities.
Stalemate
Another bit of autobiography to get us there.
By the time I was done with Humanities Computing, McGann had come up with some powerful theories we might use to get us moving beyond the forecourts of interpretation, where from the perspective of the interpretative disciplines digital humanities had stalled early in its development. 30 Being stuck myself I went for his gift-basket of theories but could not see any rationale for choice. Since theories to some degree set forth the direction of future research and embody assumptions about the world in which they operate, choice is crucial, the wrong choice potentially ruinous. To ask whether the research of a field should go in the direction expressed or implied by a theory, practitioners must have a good idea of where the field has been. They need history. 31 I decided to focus on the history of what I will call the incunabular period, from a beginning in the late 1940s to the public release of the Web in 1991. I had two reasons: the period is neatly delimited, but more importantly it defines a time we have good cause to believe was formative. 32 This gave me confidence to think that despite the dramatic changes brought about by the Web, I could determine at least some parameters for a trajectory and so uncover a range of genuine possibilities for the future.
I found abundant raw material for such a history in the professional literature, 33 but constraints of time force me to give only the briefest sketch here.
Within the incunabular period the relevant literature in the Anglophone world defines a core of three decades, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s. These decades are bracketed by two pairs of evaluative statements. The authors of the first pair argued that the then dominant use of computing to alleviate drudgery was skewing the focus of research toward problems of drudgery and away from imaginative exploration (Masterman 1962; Milic 1966) . The authors of the second pair, summing up what had been done by 1991, argued that the field had failed in its ambitions, that its work had been steadfastly ignored by mainstream scholars because it was theory-poor (Potter 1991) or wrongly directed and should turn to what Franco Moretti was almost a decade later to call 'distant reading' (Olsen 1991). 34 During those three decades Busa was among the very few who insisted that the point was not saving labour but 'more human work, more mental effort . . . to know, more systematically, deeper, and better ' (1976: 3) . Few insisted along with him that the point was not to design for efficient service but to realize that computing was something altogether new and to find out what that was. The brilliant experiments of cybernetic artists to which I referred earlier, not just in London but also in Zagreb, Paris, New York, Sydney, and elsewhere, gave glimpses of what could be done with very little. Thus the poignancy of Busa's question in 1976 on behalf of philology: 'Why can a computer do so little?'
From his analytic, philological perspective Busa pointed to the sophistication of human language. His response serves well to explain why the pioneering work in computational stylistics, first by John Burrows, then also Hugh Craig, David Hoover, Tomoji Tabata, Jan Rybicki and others, and now for literary history by Matt Jockers (2013) and former colleagues at the Stanford LitLab, 35 has been long in the oven. It is the great exception to the stalemate that concerns me here. It is exceptional, and really should rock our colleagues, because it has produced 'mounting evidence', as Burrows has said, that literature is probabilistichence that the most elusive of cultural qualities behaves in roughly the same way as both the natural and social worlds. 36 But the cause of this work's obscurity to most of us-fear of the mathematicalreturns us to the stalemate that concerns me here. What is it about numbers that frightens us away? What are we frightened of? What does this fright tell us about our relationship to digital machinery?
Let me work toward an answer by revising Busa's question: not why can the computer do so little, but why were those historical scholars doing so little with it? What was stopping or inhibiting them? We know, thanks to the cybernetic artists, that primitive kit cannot be blamed and that the kit itself had as much or more potential to inspire and excite creative work as it did to inhibit. We know from those who experimented that the concerns of the humanities were a fertile ground for experiment with computing. 37 We know that at the time a few saw what was not being done and were distressed.
As the evidence shows, 38 computer-using scholars commonly worried about lack of progress and its causes. Blame for the problem was variously fixed. But what matters historically and tells us far more of use to us now is not the causes they assigned but the fact of their persistent worrying, repeatedly, from the early 1960s on. Sensitivity to this fact foregrounds the anomalous expressions of concern about computing not merely in the professional literature of digital humanities but scattered all across the academic and popular writings of the time. However directed to whatever subject, these expressions of concern looked to an unknown future with varying degree of predictive assertiveness and disquiet. Then as now the popular press exaggerated both, and by doing that showed that a nerve had been touched. 39 It is easy for the knowledgeable practitioner to dismiss such reactions, as Parrish did in 1962 when he scorned the fearful who, he alleged, were indulging themselves 'with terrors that are meaningless to people who know anything about computers ' (1962: 2) . But as I have suggested, even techno-scientific competence was no shield to the important and significant fear of the computer becoming human. Supposed evidence, formed as such in no small measure by thinking of the human in computational terms, made this becoming seem inevitable.
In an old but still valuable 'synthetic genetic study' of fear, pioneering child psychologist G. Stanley Hall wrote that the emotion is 'not prevision but only a highly generalized fore-feeling . . . a primitive Anlage of futurity'. I quote him not merely to underscore congruence between two forwardlooking kinds of imaginative activity, computing (by design) and fear (by nature). Rather, as I suggested earlier, I want to complete my rescue of the emotion from dismissal as only, purely negative, therefore unhelpful. Thus his crucial point for my purposes: 'but for fear pain could do little of its prodigious educative work in the animal world. Fear is thus . . . the chief spur of psychic evolution ' (1914: 149, my emph.) . I will return to human psychic evolution later. For now let us agree that fear is a treasure to the historian, if a mixed blessing to those afflicted.
Fear was variously expressed in the professional literature of digital humanities: fear of the distortions computing would work on the humanities if taken seriously, evinced by the work and words of those who did take it seriously; 40 fear of its mechanization of scholarship, 41 parallel to the mechanization of which public intellectuals had been warning; 42 fear of its revolutionary force, threatening to cast aside old-fashioned ways of thinking, as literary scholar Stephen Parrish declared was about to happen; 43 and fear expressed in reassurances, such as literary critic Alan Markman's, that the computer is no threat to scholarship or a dehumanizing machine to be feared (1965: 79), or historian Franklin Pegues' in a review of the conference at which Parrish spoke, that all would be well, that the scholar still had a role to play and would not be put out of work (1965: 107). It was fundamentally an existential angst, a 'fear and trembling', as one scholar said (Nold 1975) , quoting Søren Kirkegaard.
How do we explain such evidence? Here is where the harder task of history-writing begins, in the first of the two dilations I promised earlier: outward from the professional literature, heavily filtered by academic decorum, into the social setting in which our predecessors lived. Blaming (as some have done) a bogey-man of their particular disliking-French critical theory is a favourite among empiricists-only grants it causal powers it did not have. 44 All were part of the same world. What was that world like? Our predecessors were ordinary people as we are, living more or less ordinary lives. What was ordinary life like for them?
Readings can be taken in various ways, e.g. from imaginative literature of the time, including science fiction, or from the cinema. Best for my purposes are the ambient bearers of information we can plausibly assume ordinary people, including academics, would have encountered casually, accidentally in daily life: newspapers and magazines, neighbours, shopkeepers, radio, and television. The abundance I must skip over is painful to omit, as it conjures the scene so effectively. Let me recommend that you seek out a few images that the complications of copyright and expense of reproduction prevent me from offering you: some utopic, some dystopic, with which the media were then saturated. 45 Think (1949) . Then the opposite of these: a photograph of the darkened control room of the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system with the Whirlwind computer at its core, in effect a giant military cyborg for defense of the United States against nuclear attack, fictionalized in War Games (1983); 46 the computer, on the cover of Processed World 12 (1984) as hydra-like PC automator of office-work attacking a woman at her desk with its many tentacles while her boss looks on; a looming mainframe tape drive in an advert for the Electronic Computer Programming Institute, in the Pittsburgh Press for 6 November 1966, proclaiming 'Let this machine give you a new career before it takes away your old one'; and finally a photograph of woman inside a mainframe, looking startled, accompanying an article by Warren R. Young in Life Magazine for 3 March 1961: 'The Machines Are Taking Over. Computers outdo man at his work now-and soon may outthink him'. Such images and sentiments were commonplace.
Granted: neither emotional extreme, jubilation, or terror, were at all likely to have been observed in persons who viewed these images. What seems more likely would have been more the feeling expressed in 1969 by the director of an intensive summer programme for disadvantaged students at Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, Gordon K. Davies, who expressed 'the most typical anxiety concerning man's relation to computers': the fear of oneself being reduced to data processing cards. He wrote, 'we must be careful, or we shall all become rectangles of cardboard with holes punched in them' (Davies 1969: 283) .
All of this, whether at home or at work, was enframed and informed by the defining context of computing in its infancy, the Cold War-so named by George Orwell two months after the atom bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, 9 August 1945. 47 Again, forced to be briefer than I would like, I offer another sampling of material typical of the time: a vividly illustrated Life Magazine article of 1950 based on a plan for survival of nuclear attack, hatched by Norbert Wiener and two colleagues from the History Department at MIT, with reference to the contemporary British film Seven Days to Noon (LM 1950); a 1961 article in Reader's Digest reporting on the widely publicized near miss of 5 October 1960, when an incorrect software model caused the rising moon to be falsely identified as a massive Soviet missile attack; 48 a paper in 1985 for the Symposium on Unintentional Nuclear War, in which Brian Cantwell Smith demonstrated that in principle no fool-proof system was possible-that there would always be another such moon-rise, as he said. 49 Children on both sides of the Atlantic (I, like Spencer Weart, was one of these) practiced variants of 'duck and cover', diving under desks in school to be ready for the bomb; 50 adults were instructed via civil defence bulletins and films. 51 Stanley Kubrick's Dr Strangelove (1964) told a story we recognized because we were almost living it.
What the Thunder Said
What do we make of all this?
First the obvious: that the Cold War gives us a good if partial explanation for scholars' timidity in the real or imagined presence of mainframe systems that were other to most humanists because they were physically, culturally alien, and obviously complicit.
But it also helps to explain the curious departure of the scholarly mainstream from the kinds of enquiry computing was most nearly suited for just at the time when computers became available. 52 Anthony Kenny has speculated that the majority turned away from computing to critical theory in fear of quantification (1992: 9-10). There's truth to that guess, just as there is reason behind practitioners' opposition to abstract theory, but both underplay the positive, indeed visionary hunger for theorizing as a liberating practice (cf. Hooks 1994: 59). Students were, as one said, theory-hungry (Bowlby 2013: 32) . The evidence suggests that they and their theorizing professors did not so much flee from computing as run toward and embrace new, powerful means of asking (in Terry Eagleton's words) 'the most embarrassingly general and fundamental questions, regarding [routine social practices] with a wondering estrangement which we . . . have forgotten'. 53 (1990: 34) . The mechanizers had nothing for them.
The public release of the Web in 1991, coinciding almost exactly with the end of the Cold War, was a radical game-changer. 54 But as others have remarked the Web did not address the stalemate in analytical computing, rather it shifted attention to the great stocking of the virtual shelves. The Web buried the problem rather than solved it, and by being so very useful and saleable to colleagues, Web-based resources did little to bring our discipline in from the cold intellectually.
Hence, with the thrusting of digital humanities into the limelight, the old complaints and problems have resurfaced unresolved: first, the internal relation of theorizing to making, and of scholarship to technical skills; second, the external relation of digital practices to the techno-sciences on the one hand and to the non-technical humanities on the other; third, the still unknown basis for a 'normal discourse' (Rorty 1979: 320) that would allow us to speak coherently to each other and to others. Alan Liu (2011) and Fred Gibbs (2011) have both asked the question I am struggling here to answer: where is the criticism in the digital humanities? Where indeed? The danger is temptation 'to trope away from specificity and to generalize hyperbolically . . . through an extremely abstract mode of discourse that may at times serve as a surrogate' for experience (LaCapra 1998: 23) . Ungrounded theorizing is as much an enemy as no theorizing at all. But the absence Liu and Gibbs illumine is the theoretical poverty noted at the end of the incunabular period by Rosanne Potter in her survey of previous work (1991). This poverty vexes us still. It may seem with all the activity we are witnessing, so much we cannot see it all, that the long-awaited revolution has begun (Jockers 2013: 3-4) . But actually it's been proclaimed before-e.g. by literary critic Stephen Parrish at the first conference in the field in 1964 55 -but then 'postponed owing to technical difficulties' (Mahoney 2011: 56) . The truth is that the great cognitive revolution for us has not begun even once. Natalia Cecire is right on when she argues that for humanities plus computing the central problematic-Bachelard's 'matrix or angle from which it will become possible and even necessary to formulate a certain number of precise problems' (Maniglier 2012)-is that plus; so far, as she says, we've construed the joining to be merely additive rather than transformative (Cecire 2011: 55) . The growing mass of well-presented data is continuing to change conditions of scholarly work, and with them (I suspect) much else, but this is not addressing the old problem of how we are of the huma- That's why I've embarked on a history of the present. Such a history demands use of the past to point the way forward. If long ago scholars came to the cross-roads, to that plus-sign, and were frightened either into retreating or into reducing the challenges of the machine to something comfortable, like minimizing drudgery or mining data; if we find now that we are still there wondering what to do analytically but cannot, despite healthy skepticism, shake the sense that what we know to do is only a poor beginning; then that old fright is a treasure to be used, not just understood. It directs us to the uncanny moment; what matters is our response to it, as Benjamin said. What matters is our trajectory into the future.
When Father Busa asked why the computer could do 'so little' for philology, he meant in relation to the 'monumental services' done elsewhere, especially in the sciences. In the mid 1960s, in artificial intelligence, machine translation and humanities computing, the honeymoon period came almost simultaneously to an end. 56 All three suffered 'notorious disappointments', as Cambridge Lucasian Professor Sir James Lighthill said of machine translation in 1972 (Lighthill 1973 (Lighthill /1972 . His sentence for AI can stand for them all: 'In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.' 57 (8) . But note: AI absorbed the shock and continued; computational linguistics was born out of machine translation and thrived; digital humanities, as a theoretical, critically self-aware and persuasive discipline, remained in potentia.
58
Changing the name from 'humanities computing' and being popular with the boys and girls does not solve the fundamental problem.
And so my second dilation: from the social world of digital humanists ca. 1949-1991, to the world from which digital computing arose, that of the techno-sciences, first as we know them now, then as they have been since Bacon and Galileo.
The extent of computing's influence on these sciences is unabashedly summarized by philosopher Paul Humphreys in his book Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method (2004) . 59 Because of computing, Humphreys observes, 'scientific epistemology is no longer human epistemology ' (2004: 8) . He concludes in language reminiscent of Milton's Paradise Lost: 'The Copernican Revolution first removed humans from their position at the center of the physical universe, and science has now driven humans from the center of the epistemological universe.' 60 Whether he is right is for my purposes beside the point. What matters is his language, specifically his echo of Adam and Eve's expulsion from Paradise. 61 What's going on? The best known and most fruitful pronouncement of the kind is Sigmund Freud's. Twice in 1917 he declared that scientific research had precipitated three great crises in human self-conception, or as he put it, three 'great outrages' ('große Kränkungen'):
62 first, as with Humphreys, by Copernican cosmology, which de-centered humankind; then by Darwinian evolution, which dethroned us, setting in motion discoveries of how intimately we belong to life; and finally by his own psychoanalysis, which showed we are not even masters of own minds. Less often noticed is his suggestion (implicit in the German Kränkung, from krank, 'ill, sick, diseased') that these dis-easings of mind can be turned to therapeutic effect. We are apt to see only the physician here, but Freud was in fact showing his inheritance from the whole moral tradition of the physical sciences. At least from Bacon and Galileo in the 17th century this tradition had identified the cognitively and morally curative function of science acting against fanciful or capricious knowledge-'the sciences as one would', Bacon called it. 63 Science for them was a corrective, restorative force: 'the moral enterprise of freedom for the enquiring mind', historian Alastair Crombie has written. 64 We now know that in its origins science was not anti-religious; its aim was restoration of cognitively diseased humankind to prelapsarian Adamic intelligence (McCarty 2012a: 9-11) . The religious language has gone from science (with the occasional exception, as we have seen), but the moral imperative remains. Freud's series of outrages is thus radically incomplete: they do not stop with him because the imperative to correct 'the sciences as one would' is integral to the scientific programme.
But the high moral purpose darkens when the scientific perspective is taken to be absolute, reducing human imaginings to narcissism on a cosmic scale. Consider, for example, cosmologist and Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg, who like Freud takes aim at this narcissism, proclaiming that we live in 'an overwhelmingly hostile universe' whose laws are 'as impersonal and free of human values as the laws of arithmetic', 'that human life is . . . a more-or-less farcical outcome of a chain of accidents reaching back to the first three minutes' after the Big Bang. 65 Or consider the words of geneticist and Nobel Laureate Jacques Monod, who aims at the same target, proclaiming 'that, like a gypsy, [man] lives on the boundary of an alien world that is deaf to his music, and as indifferent to his hopes as it is to his suffering or his crimes'. 66 A Blakean Nobodaddy is in the pulpit, gleefully telling us deluded children to grow up and face facts.
However severe Weinberg and Monod may be, they are indicative of a much broader sense of a mounting attack of ourselves as scientists upon ourselves as humans, summed up by biological anthropologist Melvin Konner: 'It would seem', he concludes, 'that we are sorted to a pulp, caught in a vise made, on the one side, of the increasing power of evolutionary biology . . . and, on the other, of the relentless duplication of human mental faculties by increasingly subtle and complex machines.' He asks, 'So what is left of us? ' (1991: 120) .
This question and the vision it encapsulates lie close to the recent origins of the so-called posthuman condition, which is likewise both feared and celebrated by cultural critics as the end to old conception of humanity. 67 I will return to it in a moment. But note: doesn't Konner's question sound familiar? Isn't it formally the same question that Flanders' encoder constantly asks, mindful of the 'productive unease' from which she struggles to learn? Isn't it the same question Jerry McGann has illumined by that reach for the 'hem of a quantum garment' when all else but the inexplicable anomaly has been nailed down? Again: the claustrophobia which signals a world outgrown and a transformed one in the offing, a catastrophe which punctuates the old equilibrium, precipitating a new order of things, a new idea of the human.
The cultural criticism that Alan Liu says we lack converges on much the same crisis of the human as the sciences (though it does not spare them). 'A good many theorizations of the postmodern', Hans Bertens writes, 'suggest that for some time now we have been finding ourselves in the middle of a moral, political, and cognitive mohole'-Don DeLillo's fictional cosmic zone where physical law is suspended-'and, indeed, may never get out on the other side ' (1995: 230) . The question is again, what is left of and for us?
And so to my third dilation, ambitious in the extreme, as I warned, but promising so much. Here I can only indicate where I think it takes us.
I have argued that we are situated at the posthumanizing juncture where computing meets the humanities and so replicates the larger cultural transformation expressed in and through Turing's machine. But the historical longue dure´e of becoming human shows this juncture to be one of many punctuating catastrophes. This is the story told for example by Roger Smith in Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature (2007). It is the process sketched across the millennia by Giorgio Agamben in The Open: Man and Animal (2004/2002) , in which he cites Carolus Linnaeus' 18th-century classification of us as human by virtue of our perpetually coming to know ourselves, homo nosce te ipsum. And, at the other end of the scale, is our every moment's 'going on being' in the anxious construction of self that Anthony Giddens brilliantly describes in Modernity and SelfIdentity (1991) . This same anxiety is legible in the attempts, such as René Descartes' in 1637, to counteract perhaps the most psychologically corrosive discovery of his age, the Great Apes, so physiologically similar to humans, physician Nicolaes Tulp wrote in 1641 'that it would be difficult to find one egg more like another'. 68 There is, I think, no more powerful expression of this anxiety than Jonathan Swift's depiction of Lemuel Gulliver driven insane after willingly embracing the lustful, brutish nature he had denied was his, in the form of a female Yahoo in heat. Ejected by the creatures of perfect reason for copulating with her and so revealing what he is, he returns home to find himself repelled by the smell of 'that odious animal' his wife, preferring the company and smell of his horses and of the groom who takes care of them. 69 Marvin Minsky reminds us that in making any model of what's happening (as we do when we speak of a cross-roads or plus-sign) we must never forget that the modelling relation is terniary, in other words that our plus-sign is three-dimensional, that it signifies nothing independently of us: 70 we are individually, personally, morally, psychologically involved. We are attacked, as Lionel Trilling said, by forces we would be foolish to underestimate (1967/ 1961) . But for us the catastrophic attack is no longer animal. Our digital machine has shifted the locus of engagement.
In 1970 the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori (whom I mentioned earlier) proposed that as robots become more recognizably anthropomorphic we react more favourably to them until suddenly their resemblance to us becomes uncanny and so provokes a strongly negative reaction. He called this plunge into fright 'the uncanny valley phenomenon' (Mori 2012 (Mori /1970 . Then and in a recent interview Mori has emphasized the benefit of remaining deliberately in the uncanny valley, so as better to know what it means to be human (Kageki 2012). Those of you who have seen the Bollywood film Enthiran (2010), Spanish Eva (2011), the Swedish Äkta Människor ('Real Humans', 2012), or 'Be Right Back' from the British Black Mirror (2013) will know how current in our thoughts this valley remains. For us in digital humanities the locus of engagement may well be-I think it must be-with the embodied artificial intelligence of robots. But my point for now is the uncanny valley which that plus-sign denotes.
This valley is our place of beginnings. All disciplines are that, of course-starting points for a mental expanding that is transgressive but not possessive. 'It doesn't matter so much what you learn', Northrop Frye wrote in On Education, 'when you learn it in a structure that can expand into other structures ' (1988: 10) . Our structure is the crossroads of the techno-scientific and the humanistic. That's where we begin, whether we mine individually for diamonds or collaboratively for coal (Kowarski 1972: 29) .
The Unknown, Remembered Gate
So, how do we get there? What do we do about the situation I have depicted? 'Turing's ''Machines'' . . .', Wittgenstein wrote in the mid to late 1940s, 'are humans who calculate ' (1980: 191e §1096) , and that's exactly what we find when we go back to Turing's paper of 1936, his originating metaphor of 'a man in the process of computing a real number'. So we find ourselves reduced to a 'computer' (as that man would then have been called, and as we now call the device he became). In it we discover a bare-bones stamp of the human that can do so much that is so little. Again, Fr Busa asked, why can it do so little? Now, I suggest, we must ask, how is all that it can do, and all that is imagined it will do, still so little? Or better: how do we come to know, however able it becomes, that it is so little? If it isn't, how do we make it so?
These are the questions that constitute the next step toward a digital practice that is of as well as in the humanities. This next step is the learned practitioner's open-eyed, technologically informed, imaginative, critical, hands-on questioning of what happens at the cross-roads of actual work, where computing, scholar-practitioners and the humanities meet. It opens up the shocking yet familiar otherness that is rough midwife to ourselves as will be. It defamiliarizes, as Viktor Shklovsky said, so to recover 'the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known ' (1965/1917: 12) . And while all that is going on, digital humanities needs use its 64 years of fumbling to gain leverage for a great inductive leap to a vantage point from which its disciplinary shape and trajectory, sighted dimly here, can be clearly seen. The key to its future-and in some measure the future of all the related humanities-is its history. This history we must remember.
Remember: not a tablet fetched from a storehouse just as it was written-a metaphor from classical antiquity that found at last a fitting referent in digital computing machinery-rather the creative, storytelling activity we now know it to be. That's the difficult agenda item I leave you with: to begin remembering what our predecessors did and did not do, and the conditions under which they worked, so as to fashion stories for our future. Remember that the struggle is the point of it all. Remember the humanities. 
